The Fight Against Identity Cards: One letter later.
Below is the letter I sent about Identity Cards."
Dear sir/madam,
thank you for taking the time to read this email.
I am contacting you regarding the proposed UK identity cards. It is of utmost importance that the merits of such schemes are carefully weighted against the massive threats to civil liberties and our rights as UK citizens. According to http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3556720.stm the following timetable for action is being implemented:
Nov 2003: Draft Bill published
Apr 2004: Pilot schemes begin
Autumn 2004: White Paper in Parliament
2005: Facial biometrics used on passports (scanned from passport photograph)
2007: New passports and driving licenses to require biometrics, separate ID cards optional
2013: Parliament to vote on making it compulsory for all to have some form of biometric ID
This document will cover the implementation of each scheme, the viability of such schemes and assess the associated privacy risks.
2005: Facial biometrics used on passports
According to the American civil liberties union if deployed in airports: "The evidence suggests that these systems would miss a high proportion of suspects included in the photo database, and flag huge numbers of innocent people - lessening vigilance, wasting precious manpower resources, and creating a false sense of security." They also state the technology is flawed, as shown by studies conducted by the US department of defense. Full details are available here: http://archive.aclu.org/issues/privacy/facial_recognition_faq.html
Facial recognition technology is a long way from being relied upon in mission critical scenarios, such as central government as too many variables can change.It is also highly expensive and, as the Electronic Privacy Information Center (www.epic.org) points out vital questions such as "how they should be regulated to protect the privacy of the public" have not been addressed in America."Recent concerns with the possible uses and misuses of biometrics have led to a discussion whether biometrics is privacy-enhancing or privacy threatening" according to http://www.questionpro.com/academic/723.html
Privacy concerns with biometrics include:"
· Unauthorized access to biometric data
· Unauthorized disclosure of biometric data to third parties
· Use of biometric data for other than intended purpose
· Collection of biometric data without the knowledge of the individual"
What will prevent this scheme growing into a logging exercise of every citizen's movements in the UK and across the western world, from train stations to airports to shopping malls? It is vital we resist the implementation of this technology if the democratic foundations upon which Britain is based are to be maintained. If this were an anti-terrorism operation, why would government need to scan the photographs of every British citizen holding a passport.The simple answer is: they wouldn't. People in democratic societies have the right to travel abroad without being labeled a terrorist.
Dictionary.com defines democracy as:
1. Government by the people, exercised either directly or through
elected representatives.
2. A political or social unit that has such a government.
3. The common people, considered as the primary source of political
power.
4. Majority rule.
5. The principles of social equality and respect for the individual
within a community.
Does facial recognition technology provide "respect for the individual".
Dictionary.com defines communism as:
1. A theoretical economic system characterized by the collective
ownership of property and by the organization of labor for the
common advantage of all members.
2. *Communism*
1. A system of government in which the state plans and controls
the economy and a single, often authoritarian party holds
power, claiming to make progress toward a higher social
order in which all goods are equally shared by the people.
2. The Marxist-Leninist version of Communist doctrine that
advocates the overthrow of capitalism by the revolution of
the proletariat.
Does facial recognition technology set the precedent for government featuring an : "authoritarian party hold(ing) power".
2007: New Passports and Driving Licenses to require biometrics, separate ID cards optional.
2013: Parliament to vote on making it compulsory for all to have some form of biometric ID.
Privacy issue 1: Passports and Driving Licenses to require biometrics.
The UK Home office works for the people and one of its most important emerging duties is to protect UK citizens' "freedom to travel" safely. According to the home office website at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/inside/aims/index.html its mission is "To facilitate travel by UK citizens", "to develop the potential of every individual" and to allow for "the development of civil society". The UK Home Office aims "*To support strong and active communities in which people of all races and backgrounds are valued and participate on equal terms* by developing social policy to build a fair, prosperous and cohesive society in which everyone has a stake."
An introduction of biometrics on passports and driving licenses would compromise these aims. Dr Gus Hosein from Privacy International told the BBC "With the biometric passport, every country may have its own surveillance system, accumulating fingerprints and face-scans and keeping them for as long as they wish with no regard to privacy or civil liberties." "Governments may claim that they are under an international obligation to create national databases of fingerprints and face scans but we will soon see nations with appalling human rights records generating massive databases, and then requiring our own fingerprints and face-scans as we travel" from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3582461.stm
Worse are the widespread rumours that Tony Blair is merely a puppet run by America on this issue. During the Prime Ministers Question Time of 15th December 2004, a transcript of which can be found here: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmhansrd/cm041215/debtext/41215-03.htm#41215-03_spmin1 he said:
"First, as we know in the House, this issue has been debated over many years, and compulsory ID cards will not come in for several years in any event. So there is a long period in which we can get this right—it is obviously important that we do. The point that I would make is that what has changed my mind on identity cards is that we now have the technology and, indeed, will effectively be obliged to use it for passports, which represents the bulk of the cost—£70 out of the £85 is for the passport, which we will have to introduce in any event. indeed, will effectively be obliged to use it for passports and when it really can make a difference on some of these issues—this is a common consensus certainly among the police and enforcement services—that we make it clear that ID cards will be introduced. The right hon. Gentleman is perfectly right, however, to raise a series of practical difficulties and objections. It is exactly those that we need to iron out over the next few years."
Significantly he states: "indeed, (the UK) will effectively be obliged to use it for passports", in which he refers to the American introduction of biometric passports. He goes on to state "what has changed my mind on identity cards is that we now have the technology". I would point out we have successfully developed the hydrogen bomb, however do not use it because it is inhumane and because we are not at war. Furthermore the elderly ministers who have promoted the use of biometric technology will not be alive to see the full implications of this scheme.
Biometrics will however be collected from children, who will no longer be able to share parent passports.That means they could be on a government database with biometric data from the age of one or lower. They will be tracked entirely and yet not be able to condemn the system for another seventeen years. Our legacy to them will be one of mistrust and corruption.
Dictionary.com defines human rights as:
The basic rights and freedoms to which all humans are entitled,
often held to include the right to life and liberty, freedom of
thought and expression, and equality before the law.
Will biometric technology infringe on "the basic rights and freedoms to which all humans are entitled".
Privacy issue 2: separate ID cards optional
Dictionary.com defines optional as:
Left to choice; not compulsory or automatic.
no2id.net talks about the optional elements of an ID card system: 'You will not be required to use a card unless you wish to work, use the banking or health system, travel or receive benefits. As Mr Blunkett advised Parliament : “The issuing of a card does not force anyone to use it, although in terms of drivers or passport users, or if services - whether public or private - required some proof of identity before expenditure was laid out, without proof of identity and therefore entitlement to do it I doubt whether non-use of it would last very long.”' Mr Blunkett evidently does not consider the ID cards optional, and neither do I.
"I would not have countenanced ID cards before 9/11 but after 9/11 I accept we have to consider them because it is incumbent on all of us to examine carefully any measures which might enhance the nation's security" was the comment from David Davis, shadow home secretary. His argument fails to recognize that "all *the September 11th terrorists entered the US on valid documents* - ID Cards would have made no difference to their actions." found on Trevor Mendham's site at http://www.trevor-mendham.com/civil-liberties/identity-cards/fight-crime.html
The animation at http://www.no2id.net/content/flash01.html informs viewers that "US state department figures show that international terrorism is at its lowest levels for 25 years" and indeed that David Blunkett believes ID cards will have limited effectiveness against terrorism. He is right on this issue. Professional terrorists will simply find ways around the identification system as they have done in the past, and leave those innocent to be persecuted.
According to the home office, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/comrace/identitycards/faq.html#2
The aims of the scheme are:
* To tackle illegal working and immigration abuse;
* To disrupt the use of false and multiple identities by organized
criminals and those involved in terrorist activity;
* To help protect people from identity fraud and theft
* To improve public confidence and strengthen our security
* To ensure free public services are only used by those entitled to
them;
* To enable easier and more convenient access to public services
1) To tackle illegal working and immigration abuse.
Illegal immigrants will continue to avoid boarder guards and continue to take cash-in-hand jobs. This aim will not be fulfilled even if all the governments proposals are passed.
2) To disrupt the use of false and multiple identities by organized criminals and those involved in terrorist activity.
The home office propose one card that once faked will give the carriers access to all public services.
3) To help protect people from identity fraud and theft
Theft:
- refusal to obey an order to register = £2500
- failure to submit to fingerprinting and biometric scanning = £2500
- failure to provide information demanded by the government = £2500
- failure to attend an interview at a specified place and time = £2500
- failure to notify authorities about a lost, stolen, damaged or defective card = up to 51 weeks in prison and/or a fine
- failure to renew a card = £1000
- failure to attend subsequent fingerprinting and biometric scanning when demanded = £1000
- failure to provide subsequent information when demanded = £1000
- failure to attend subsequent interview at specified place and time when demanded = £1000
- failure to notify authorities of any change in personal circumstances (including change of address) = £1000
- providing false information = up to 2 years and/or a fine
from http://www.defy-id.org.uk/more_info.htm
Identity fraud will continue with or without an ID card. With such a powerful card, there will be increased incentive to break the system. Trevor Mendham points out "*Most benefit fraud is /not/ identity fraud*. Instead it comes from people claiming benefit whilst actually working or otherwise lying about their circumstances. Identity Cards will do nothing to prevent this."
4) To improve public confidence and strengthen our security
Public confidence in biometric technology is already low. To proclaim ID cards will change this is ludicrous. Our security could be better strengthened with some extra police.
5) To ensure free public services are only used by those entitled to them
Actually the real issue is whether the home office can defend our boarders.Evidence suggest they cannot. Penalizing British citizens is not going to assist here. When fake ID cards begin to circulate it will be easier than ever for immigrants to use the public services.
6) To enable easier and more convenient access to public services
That could only be achieved by raising the speed limits, improving public transport or placing services nearer the people, like post offices or hospitals or police stations or fire stations to name a few.
The peoples of Great Britain do not want ID cards. Please listen to them.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you again for reading this email. I await your reply."
So at the end of this you can see how strongly I feel on the subject. Nobody afterall has made any convincing arguement why I should have one, and I'm not prepared to accept the "everyone else has one" arguement.
While I left the politicans to consider their responses, I began to think what else we could use 5.5 billion pounds or 10,303,774,270.48 US dollars on. Police? Boarder guards? Some new hospitals? Or all three.
A short time later the replies arrived.
Three replies I recieved were supporting ID cards, notably from the labour MP who first promoted the scheme Nick Palmer, the labour party itself and finally the Home Office. Nick was unwilling to discuss the matter with non-constituents so I was left with two replies (See below):
The Labour party:
"Thank you for your email.
I would like to assure you that any comments made or concerns raised are always read carefully and passed on to the appropriate department. The time and trouble people take in writing to us is greatly appreciated.
We are taking action now to prepare the UK for the challenges of the 21st century – on crime, security, illegal immigration and ensuring free public services are available to those entitled to them. We need to balance the benefits of increasing freedom to live, work and travel with making sure that freedom is not exploited.
Biometric passports will start to be issued from 2005 onwards. A pilot has almost been completed with 10,000 volunteers across the country having their face, iris and fingerprint biometrics recorded; another pilot at Heathrow is registering iris details from frequent travellers to test how the technology might operate at the border.
·Polls show that 80 per cent of adults are in favour of a national ID card scheme, and 81 per cent of Labour members were in favour.
·New biometric technology brings a new level of reliable identification, both in passports and in ID cards. The cards will have 3 biometrics - face recognition, fingerprint, and iris – making them far more reliable than those used in other countries
·Correct identification has become critically important. Right across the world there is a drive to increase the security of passports. Soon, the US will require a biometric passport for entry – or a special visa costing $100 per visit.
·About 80% of the cost of the ID card scheme is required to make passports more secure. The remaining 20% is what it takes to build on these improvements and introduce a national scheme. Universal coverage and secure, online verification brings the real benefits against organised crime, terrorism, and illegal working, and protecting free public services from exploitation.
·Multiple or false identities are used in more than a third of terrorist related activity and in organised crime and money laundering. The police and intelligence services are in no doubt that ID cards would help them undermine and deter terrorists in their activities.
·ID cards cannot protect us single-handedly from terrorist attacks, or organised crime, or illegal immigration; they are a part of a package of measures to make us more secure, not a magic wand.
·We have listened to people's concerns in consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny and have improved the proposals to ensure that there is no trade-off between the benefits of an identity scheme and people's civil liberties.
·The information stored by the scheme will be fixed by parliament and restricted to information required to establish identity; there will be strengthened oversight by a single commissioner; and people's rights under existing data protection will be respected.
·There will be no requirement to carry a card, nor any new powers for the police or anyone else to stop people and demand to see their card.
·So what difference will the scheme make? Only that on the kinds of occasions when people are already asked to say who they are – when they come into the country, or apply for a job, or register with a GP – or on the rare occasions when someone is stopped by the police for a suspected offence – there will be a single, reliable way for them to show who they are.
I would encourage you to contact the Home Office for further details of the scheme.
Thank you again for contacting us."
I was very impressed by how civil and polite the Labour Party and the Home Office were.
The Home Office
Dear Sir or Madam,
Thank you for your email of 5 January 2005.
Proposals for a national compulsory identity cards scheme, to strengthen national security and protect people's identity, were set out on 29 November 2004 when the Government published the Identity Cards Bill.
Our decision to introduce identity cards has been taken following a wide ranging debate, starting with the announcement in February 2002 of the original consultation and continuing more recently with the consultation on the draft legislation. We are pleased that so many people and organisations have contributed to this public debate.
The Government's decision to proceed with the introduction of a national identity cards scheme is based partly on the fact that we will have to introduce more secure personal identifiers (biometrics) into our passports and other existing documents in line with international requirements. Right across the world there is a drive to increase document security with biometrics, on which we can't be left behind. It is worth remembering that 21 of the 25 EU Member States (all apart from the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Latvia) have identity cards.
Under current plans, for example, from next autumn, British tourists who need a new passport will have to get a biometric one to visit the US or get a biometric visa. We will - rightly - have to bear the costs of introducing the new technology to enhance our passports anyway.
The decision to introduce biometrics into existing identity documents has therefore already been made. Without an identity cards scheme, the majority of the population would be enrolled via existing identity documents like passports anyway. The costs involved in this would be nearly the same as implementing a comprehensive identity cards scheme available to the whole resident population, but without the added benefits.
So what we gain with the ID card, over and above just adding biometrics to existing documents, are the benefits flowing from secure identification and a register to hold the information, such as in tackling illegal working and fraudulent access to public services. Added to this, offering an ID card at a reduced cost for those on low incomes and the elderly will give the least well off the same means of proving their identity as those who can afford to travel abroad.
The latest polls show that 80% of the public support the introduction of ID cards and a majority of the public agree that ID cards will help:
· Fight terrorism
· Prevent benefit fraud
· Control illegal immigration
· Fight crime
Identity cards will be linked to existing documents such as passports and will incorporate biometric information such as fingerprints or an iris image. The introduction of identity cards on a phased basis will on current plans start from 2008.
There will be no requirement to carry a card all the time; this is specifically prohibited in the Bill and there will be no new powers for the police to stop someone and demand to see their card.
However, no date has yet been set for a decision on a move to compulsion. There are a number of factors which the Government will need to consider before recommending a move to compulsion to Parliament. These are explained in Identity Cards: the next steps (CM 6020).
Many people may, of course, choose to carry their cards voluntarily and the police already have powers to take steps to identify a person who has been arrested for a recordable offence, including checking biometric information. There are also classes of criminal offences which are non-arrestable and are enforced by sending a summons. In these situations, the police have to be certain of a person's name and address. If a person refuses to identify themselves in these circumstances or the police are not satisfied with the information given, they also have a power of arrest after which biometric checks can be made.
The National Identity Register will link each individual's record to a biometric that is unique to that person. This means that even without a card being produced, it will be possible to check someone's biometric information directly with the National Identity Register to establish his or her identity. This could be done with the person's consent or without consent in certain limited circumstances such as establishing the identity of arrested persons in line with the powers set out above.
Information from the Register can only be provided if specifically authorised by or under the powers in the Bill. The Bill has been drafted to allow the holding of basic identity information, such as name, address, date and place of birth. The Bill also allows the holding of information such as validation history and records of when to whom details of an entry have been provided. However, clause 14 is drafted to ensure that organisations verifying identity cannot be provided with this kind of information even with the consent of the individual. Powers to provide information without consent in clauses 19 to 23 are also strictly limited. Information may be disclosed without consent to Security and Intelligence Agencies to ensure that the scheme helps in the fight against terrorism. The Police, Customs and Inland Revenue may also be provided with the "registrable facts" held, minus the audit trail of card use for law enforcement and related purposes. Provision of information regarding e.g. card usage to those bodies would only apply in cases of serious crimes. The Bill ensures that provision of information without consent will be properly regulated and subject to independent oversight. Unauthorised disclosure of information from the Register is a criminal offence under clause 29 of the Bill.
Complementing the legislative protection, the accreditation process provides specific safeguards. The identity cards agency will be accrediting user organisations based on the type of information they are requesting provision of, as well as a justification of why they are requesting it. We will also reserve the right to audit any user organisation processes to ensure they remain compliant with the ultimate sanction for those who are misusing information being the removal of accreditation.
The Government's proposals are designed to safeguard, not erode, civil liberties by protecting people's true identity against fraud and by enabling them to prove their identity more easily when accessing public or private services. The Bill sets limitations on the information that may be held by the scheme and its use. This is a key safeguard against function creep. Only Parliament would be able to change the statutory purposes of the Register or the type of information, which could be held.
An identity card will strengthen peoples' privacy because it will provide highly verified evidence of identity rather than being asked by private sector organisations for a range of less secure documents which may contain a broad range of additional information not relevant to checking an individual's identity. The existence of a register is not a threat to privacy; 44 million people in this country are already comfortable with their data being held by DVLA or Passport Service. Privacy is only threatened if there are not sufficient safeguards to disclosure. The Government has set out these safeguards in the Bill for Parliament to establish.
Currently, there is a situation where we do actually have a function creep in our existing identity documents due to the lack of any other reliable proof of identity. So, for example the National Insurance Number is often accepted as proof of eligibility to work, which it is not. A driving licence is used as de facto proof of identity, without the strict identity checking process being carried out when it is issued.
The identity card will be for all United Kingdom residents but British nationals living abroad will not need cards. However, any British citizen coming back to live in the UK can apply for an identity card on their return if they do not already hold one.
Every foreign national (including European Union nationals), resident in the UK for more than 3 months will need to obtain a card. Those coming for short visits will use their passport (or European identity card) to prove identity whilst they are resident in the UK.
It is envisaged an identity card will help UK residents establish their identity and entitlement to services in a simple, easy, convenient way and to regulate access to public services to reduce fraudulent use of services by those not entitled and in time to deliver more efficient access to services.
However, I must emphasise that we have never said that the identity cards scheme is intended to be the sole solution to identity fraud, illegal immigration and working, or terrorism. The scheme is therefore not being designed to be the primary method of combating these problems. Nevertheless, the Security services and Sir John Stevens, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, have stated that they believe an identity card scheme will help in the fight against these problems.
They tell us in cases of serious crime or threats to national security, the scheme will provide, subject to appropriate authorisation procedures, the capability for law enforcement and intelligence and security agencies to be provided with information on when a person's record on the Register has been checked or amended. Police identification of terrorist suspects make the terrorists' life harder: they have to find round-about ways to stay in hotels, rent accommodation, hire cars, and buy mobile phones.
The Spanish police have also stated that their identity cards scheme makes life harder for terrorists and easier for the police. The culture of identity cards in Spain has marginalised terrorists who are driven to reside outside Spain. Identity cards have also meant that the police have a better idea of who they are looking for when tracking down a terrorist as they will have information available such as a photograph, age, fingerprint and addresses and can focus their investigations faster.
The police organisations are convinced that ID cards will be useful in the fight against crime. They have pointed to the benefits associated with the speedy means of identifying individuals on the street where an individual volunteers his ID card which avoids wasted police time. This will free up time to spend on front-line patrols. ID cards will also assist in the prevention of fraud, money laundering, illegal working and illegal immigration and providing a reliable proof of age.
The Government published proposals for reforming the law on fraud in 'Fraud Law Reform: Consultation on Proposals for Legislation' on 17 May 2004. The consultation is part of a much wider package of initiatives which will help in tackling fraud. The main proposal in the consultation is for a general offence of fraud which can be committed in three different ways: by false representation, by wrongfully failing to disclose information, or by abuse of office. In each case the behaviour must be dishonest and must aim at securing a gain for the defendant or a loss for another. The consultation also includes proposals for new offences of 'obtaining services dishonestly' and 'possessing equipment to commit frauds'. Some of these proposals may cover situations in which an identity card is used fraudulently e.g. fraud by false representation might be made out when a person used a false identity card. In such a case it would be for the prosecution to decide which offence would be most appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The law of forgery might also be relevant.
We do not believe it would be satisfactory to rely on offences proposed in the consultation on fraud reform alone. For example, under the proposed offence of fraud by false representation, it would be necessary to prove that a person with a false identity card made a representation which he knew to be false or misleading or was aware that it might be false or misleading and in doing so, intended to secure a gain for himself or a loss for another person. Under the proposed offence in the Identity Cards Bill, it would be sufficient to show that a defendant had in his possession, a false identity card, or one which has been improperly obtained, or belonged to another, without reasonable excuse. Where intent could be shown, an alternative offence could be charged. Penalties for proposed offences in the consultation on reform of fraud law suggest penalties of between 3 and 10 years. This is consistent with proposals in the Identity Cards Bill of penalties of between 2 and 10 years.
The new offence of possession of false documents has been drafted to provide that it should not just apply to ID cards issued under the Identity Cards legislation but will also apply to other identity documents. These include UK passports, immigration documents and driving licences. It also covers driving licences, passports or identity cards issued by other countries. It is intended that these provisions should be brought into force as soon as practicable in order to provide an immediate and stronger deterrent to the possession of any false or improperly obtained identity documents together with an identity document belonging to someone else without reasonable excuse.
Identity cards will help to combat identity fraud and theft because the National Identity Register will be starting from the electronic equivalent of a blank sheet of paper, not an existing database. Any incorrect data in an existing database would not be imported into the Register; the only way for an individual to have a record added would be by going through the full identity card enrolment process with all the checks that would entail. The National Register would be a single highly reliable record of a person's identity, with checks having been made, for example against passport, driving licence and immigration records as appropriate. The Register will link each individual's record to a "biometric" measure such as an iris or finger record. Recording biometrics from all applicants, together with more traditional security checks, should ensure that it is virtually impossible to obtain an ID card in multiple identities, provide a means for individuals to protect their personal details and for organisations to make more rigorous checks on the identities of their customers.
The Government recognises that a scheme covering the whole of the UK adult population will be an attractive target to criminals. However, we need to set this out in the context of a world where people's identities are increasingly insecure by relying on systems designed for other purposes e.g. driving licences.
It is important that the integrity of information about an individual and the link to that individual using biometrics must be secure, therefore every effort is being made to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the Register to minimise the risk of identity theft.
Our priority is protecting the privacy of individuals whose information is held by the scheme. That is why we take security so seriously.
Experience from previous projects has shown that early detailed design work on feasibility and testing reduces the risks and increases success. Security is at the heart of this design process.
As a number of the checks will be made on the card not the Register, we also need to ensure the security of the card and the chip. Personal information must be protected from being seen by unauthorised persons, copied, misused or altered. However, security is not just about ensuring the technology around the database and card is sufficient, but also about ensuring the security of the personnel running the scheme, the enrolment process and verification methods. This is all being considered as part of the design and accreditation processes.
Biometrics are being used to more strongly tie a verified identity to an individual. In this way, biometrics can be used along with an ID card to verify that identity against the record held for that card. Other forms of authentication, such as PIN numbers and passwords can be stolen along with a card so are much weaker at linking a person to an identity.
Biometrics do not provide perfect identification of an individual. Rather, they greatly enhance the security and reliability of more traditional techniques such as photographs and signatures. Even though the performance of the best biometrics is extremely good, there remains the possibility that an individual will not be accurately identified though his or her biometric. Even so, biometrics provide much better verification of identity than most other techniques. Identification errors are more likely to arise from clerical errors than from use of biometrics.
Use of biometrics will also make it much more difficult for a fraudster to obtain a second identity card as the biometrics can be checked against those already on the NIR to see if they are already registered. It will also provide an additional means of associating an individual to a particular identity card, which greatly increases the security and robustness by supplementing more traditional methods such as photographs and signatures.
Lastly addressing your email of 23 January 2005, we endeavour to respond to enquiries within 20 working days.
The Identity Cards Bill is available on the Parliament website:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmbills/008/2005008.htm
or if you would like to obtain a hard copy of The Bill this would cost £6, however you will have to write to:
Her Majesty's Stationery Office
St Clements House
2-16 Colegate
Norwich
NR3 1BQ
More information about identity cards is also available on http://www.identitycards.gov.uk
We are grateful for the time you have taken to comment on this issue.
I sent a follow-up email informing everyone that the information was available online and that the Home Office had yet to reply (which they then did).
The impact of my letter cannot be understated. Excerpts from it went onto the Liberal Democrat website, A member of NO2ID posted on my previous blog and various other people who I'd emailed posted as "anonymous" with words of encouragement.
A quote on the page: "instead of wasting hundreds of millions of pounds on compulsory ID cards as the Tory Right demand, let that money provide thousands of extra police officers on the beat in our local communities." - Tony Blair http://www.timbro.se/bokhandel/rapport/fulltext/r202195.htm
went on to be used by Charles Kennedy in Prime Minister's Question Time.
Much of the information provided in the replies is, however, false.
Time constraints prevent me from analysing every line as I would like, but here are a few key aspects of the above letters I have picked out as questionable:
"We are taking action now to prepare the UK for the challenges of the 21st century – on crime, security, illegal immigration and ensuring free public services are available to those entitled to them. We need to balance the benefits of increasing freedom to live, work and travel with making sure that freedom is not exploited."
//Entitlement is very different to identification. This site has more information on the importance of making that distinction: http://www.trevor-mendham.com/civil-liberties/identity-cards/entitlement.html //
"Biometric passports will start to be issued from 2005 onwards. A pilot has almost been completed with 10,000 volunteers across the country having their face, iris and fingerprint biometrics recorded;
// In this pilot, no data was stored. The database integrity was not tested. //
another pilot at Heathrow is registering iris details from frequent travellers to test how the technology might operate at the border."
// Note that these are volunteers and are not in the majority. //
"·Polls show that 80 per cent of adults are in favour of a national ID card scheme, and 81 per cent of Labour members were in favour."
// A powerful statistic, but not a valid one: “the MORI polling organisation also has a commercial interest in ID Cards, as they are running the selection process for the 10,000 "volunteers" who are to participate in the Passport Office's Biometrics evaluation trial” “even Detica have to admit that: "Although 94% of people are aware of the scheme’s existence, two thirds (67%) have little or no knowledge of the Government’s national ID card proposals." “This invalidates any claims that 80% of the public support the actual Biometric ID card scheme which is being proposed by the Government - how can they if they do not know the details ?” found at http://www.spy.org.uk/spyblog/archives/000259.html. What is more important to note is that: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3728043.stm the bbc reports a different poll conducted by yougov that states: “Up to 5 million people (28%) would demonstrate against ID cards”. //
"·New biometric technology brings a new level of reliable identification, both in passports and in ID cards. The cards will have 3 biometrics - face recognition, fingerprint, and iris – making them far more reliable than those used in other countries"
// More incentive to fake the cards and more dependency on the government database. The MORI poll also revealed "41% lack confidence in the Government's ability to store personal information securely". //
"·Correct identification has become critically important. Right across the world there is a drive to increase the security of passports. Soon, the US will require a biometric passport for entry – or a special visa costing $100 per visit."
// The US reasoning for biometrics is to fight against terrorism, and yet, as mentioned previously, all the September 11 th terrorists entered on legal documents.//
"·About 80% of the cost of the ID card scheme is required to make passports more secure. The remaining 20% is what it takes to build on these improvements and introduce a national scheme. Universal coverage and secure, online verification brings the real benefits against organised crime, terrorism, and illegal working, and protecting free public services from exploitation."
// Only so long as the integrity of the system is not compromised. Once that occurs we will be less secure than before the cards were introduced. //
"·Multiple or false identities are used in more than a third of terrorist related activity and in organised crime and money laundering. The police and intelligence services are in no doubt that ID cards would help them undermine and deter terrorists in their activities."
// Those that do establish successful ways of undermining the system will be harder to catch than ever before. //
"·The information stored by the scheme will be fixed by parliament and restricted to information required to establish identity; there will be strengthened oversight by a single commissioner; and people's rights under existing data protection will be respected."
// Currently the United Kingdom is one of the few democratic nations worldwide without a constitution protecting the rights of its citizens. No regulation currently exists to prevent governments (not necessarily labour) from abusing this newfound technology. //
"·There will be no requirement to carry a card, nor any new powers for the police or anyone else to stop people and demand to see their card."
// Guy Herbert, General Secretary of NO2ID stated in response to this "There will be "no new powers" to demand cards because those powers can be constructed on the basis of existing law.
Police have powers dating back to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 [totemic, or what?] to arrest a person whom they stop and question when they are not satisfied as to that person's identity. With biometric ID as a "gold standard" of identification, it seems unlikely the police will be satisfied with less for long. Even if one is not arrested, then one is likely to be frogmarched to get one's card in order to avoid arrest. So compulsory carry and production for police can in effect be created without further legislation.
But, you may object, that only applies to people whom police may legitimately stop, doesn't it? Indeed. But that category in being extended all the time. To quote only the most arrant example: Pursuant to terrorism legislation, police forces can designate specified areas as ones in which officers may stop and search without reasonable cause. This was explained to parliament as necessary to catch fugitives in the aftermath of a terrorist incident, or where it was necessary to forestall a specific attack discovered by intelligence. Notwithstanding, the entire Metropolitan Police area has been so designated, indefinitely.
So a Met officer may stop you at random and demand to know who you are under the existing state of affairs, and arrest you for further enquiries if you can't satisfy him as to your identity. What are your chances of satisfying him and avoiding arrest going to be if you _could_ have an ID card on you, but _don't_? Most officers will assume you dan't have your card because you have something to hide.
Immigration officers, BTW, already have the same power to randomly demand ID nationally."
"·So what difference will the scheme make? Only that on the kinds of occasions when people are already asked to say who they are – when they come into the country, or apply for a job, or register with a GP – or on the rare occasions when someone is stopped by the police for a suspected offence – there will be a single, reliable way for them to show who they are."
// Applying for a job or benefits is something everybody has to do. Registering with a GP is something everybody has to do. Introducing ID cards will encourage the police to be racist in their hunt for illegal immigrants. //
"Our decision to introduce identity cards has been taken following a wide ranging debate, starting with the announcement in February 2002 of the original consultation and continuing more recently with the consultation on the draft legislation. We are pleased that so many people and organisations have contributed to this public debate."
// Yet based on the governments own figures, only 27% of the population actually know even the most basic knowledge of the implications of Identity cards.//
"offering an ID card at a reduced cost for those on low incomes and the elderly will give the least well off the same means of proving their identity as those who can afford to travel abroad."
// Another indication that the card is not optional//
“The National Identity Register will link each individual's record to a biometric that is unique to that person. This means that even without a card being produced, it will be possible to check someone's biometric information directly with the National Identity Register to establish his or her identity. This could be done with the person's consent or without consent in certain limited circumstances such as establishing the identity of arrested persons in line with the powers set out above.”
//For it to be successful these statements (and others) must remain true:
1) We will be friends with America forever.
2) An extremist party (like the BNP) will never be elected.
3) Biometrics are completely infallible.
4) An employee will never be bribed.
5) The database will never go down.
6) A group of hackers will never bypass the security.//
Finally I will conclude by saying that the defences of Great Britain's privacy and rights are no longer guaranteed safe. Labour has shown that Britain is just as vulnerable to apathy as Germany was when Hitler got into power.
Click here to go back to the Fight Against ID cards main page.
Labels: Human Rights, ID cards, My philosophy, Politics, Privacy
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